The Future of Poland’s Foreign Policy Under Tusk

By Luke Park and Caleb Chen

Commentary

With the emergence of Tusk and the retreat of Euroscepticism in Poland, the country is gearing itself to be a regional leader in the new security paradigm instigated by the Ukraine War. Tusk’s administration seeks to diverge from the former Law and Justice (PiS) government’s foreign policy by reaffirming Poland’s commitment to the EU and NATO, as well as boosting its military capabilities to deter Russian aggression. 

Poland’s role in European security since the Russo-Ukrainian conflict began cannot be understated. From accepting millions of refugees to making direct armament transfers to Ukraine, Poland is essential to Europe’s collective defense strategy against Russia. Cooperation with NATO and the EU is viewed as a critical national interest amongst many Poles who harbor pro-European sentiment. However, that perspective has come under intense scrutiny under eight years of the Law and Justice (PiS) party’s right-wing nationalist governance centering around Eurosceptic views.  
 
The effort to turn the eight years of illiberal tide that left a consequential imprint on Polish democracy and foreign policy began with Donald Tusk’s electoral victory in the October 2023 parliamentary elections. Tusk was the Prime Minister of Poland between 2007 and 2014 and the leader of the Civic Platform, a center-right political party. He has pushed for greater economic and political ties between Poland and the EU. In 2015, he became the President of the European Council, coordinating a unified European response to the Russian annexation of Crimea and the 2015 migrant crisis, and he was a key negotiator for the EU during the Brexit negotiations of 2016.  
 
In the 2023 parliamentary elections, the broadly centrist coalition formed between Tusk’s Civic Coalition, Third Way, and the Left won 248 seats against the 194 seats won by the PiS and 18 by the far-right Confederation. Some of the highly contentious domestic policies that contributed to the PiS' defeat included the partisan court packing, the de-facto total ban on abortions, and the cash-for-visa scandal, all of which critically damaged the PiS’ legitimacy. However, the PiS still maintained the largest plurality after the Civic Coalition, denying the governing coalition a supermajority that would allow them to overturn PiS president Andrzej Dudas’ presidential veto, creating a legislative gridlock.  
 
Despite winning a slim majority, the victory of Tusk’s coalition will entail the reversal of most PiS foreign policies, primarily that of restarting channels of cooperation between Poland and the EU and continuing the path of stepping up as a major military power in the new European collective landscape. 
 
Background of PiS Foreign Policy

The Law and Justice Party is described as a center-right to far-right Eurosceptic party. Their brand of Euroscepticism emphasizes Polish national sovereignty, an ideology that pursues the reshaping of Polish society and politics free from the intervention of Brussels. Between 2015 and 2023, the party commanded an absolute majority in the Sejm (the Polish Legislature), as well as the presidency with Andrzej Duda.  
 
Polish Constitutional Crisis and Judicial Conflict with the EU 
The PiS government had been constantly in conflict with the European Union regarding Poland’s challenges against the supremacy of EU law and the country's offensive against domestic judicial independence. In 2015, the PiS government passed sweeping reforms to the Polish judicial system, packing the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (which interprets the Polish Constitution and has judicial review authority) with PiS appointees, effectively destroying judicial independence. Furthermore, PiS has utilized its control over the judicial branch to shape domestic policies such as banning abortion and declaring that Polish domestic law is supreme over EU law. In response, the EU determined that Poland was undermining the rule of law by not abiding to EU values of separation of powers and a transparent democratic process. This led to the EU freezing its aid toward Poland and fining the country 1 million Euros every day it fails to comply with EU laws.  
 
The PiS government also contested EU policies that didn’t align with their agenda by filing lawsuits against the EU in the European Courts to delay their implementation. Examples include climate change goals and programs proposed by Brussels and the migration pact agreed upon and negotiated by most other EU member states in 2023.  
 
Partnership with Hungary 
Similarly perceiving a threat to their sovereignty from the EU, Hungary has allied with Poland to shield each other from EU sanctions. As these two states frequently deviated from European values of liberal democracy, the EU fiercely reprimanded them and promoted restoring their judicial independence. However, by vetoing the European Commission’s Article 7 process when used against either state, which suspends their EU member voting rights, Poland and Hungary provided mutual support. In 2017, during the height of the Polish judicial reform protests, the EU attempted to trigger Article 7 but was vetoed by Hungary. The benefits of the economic bloc and defense ties of being a member state in the EU still vastly outweigh the political rhetoric of the illiberal majority. To this end, Poland and Hungary have maintained the risky act of balancing pragmatic benefits and political friction, which actively hampered collective actions in the eyes of many other member states. 
 
South Korean Arms Trade 
Amidst the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, the recent arms deal with South Korea has given Poland a substantial chance at leapfrogging into a powerful regional military player.
 
In 2023, The PiS government signed a major arms deal with South Korea, totaling $13.7 billion, to acquire modern weapons that would replenish the weapons that Poland sent to Ukraine. Additionally, Poland increased its defense spending up to 4% of its national GDP in 2023, a $10 billion or roughly a 68.6% increase from the previous fiscal year. This has elevated Poland’s status as a key military player in the European security landscape, potentially becoming a regional defense leader in the near future. 
 
The major South Korean arms manufacturers offer expedited delivery windows and cheaper yet high-quality alternatives to German and American weapons. The deal includes procuring hundreds of Chunmoo rocket launchers, 820 K2 tanks, 672 K9 self-propelled howitzers, and 48 FA-50 light fighter aircraft, with 500 of the 820 K2 and 300 of the 672 K9 licensed for production in Polish factories starting in 2026. This is Poland’s most significant military upgrade since the Cold War.
 
After the October election, Donald Tusk has indicated that he will follow through with the deal despite the change in government and complaints by the domestic arms industry. However, Poland’s inability to finance their purchases is jeopardizing the deal. South Korea and Poland are currently working on terms for possible loans. Tusk’s persistence in continuing this deal represents Poland’s expedited growth in its military capabilities being a reinvigorated priority for his government. 
 
Fracturing of Polish-Ukrainian Relations 
Due to the existential implications the Russo-Ukrainian War has on Poland’s geopolitics, PiS government has been firm on its support for Ukraine. However, due to the conflicting national interests and domestic electoral uncertainties, the last days of PiS governance have been marked by unprecedented friction with Kyiv.

Poland’s solidarity with Ukraine has eroded, with grain imports being the most prominent case of contention. As the war stymied Ukrainian commerce and exports, the EU decided to establish “solidarity lanes'' that would promote more grain and agricultural trade with Ukraine by allowing transit of goods to export hubs through the member states. However, this raised concerns over the potential harm to the competitiveness of Polish goods in the EU market. In general, states wish to protect their agricultural sector from cheaper imports. By eliminating tariffs and quotas, the exposure to cheap Ukrainian grain imports undermined the income of Polish farmers. Acting on domestic sentiment against Ukrainian imports, in April of 2023, the PiS government enacted trade restrictions against Ukraine with a compromise being reached at the EU level to ban the sale of Ukrainian imports domestically. The Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during his address to the United Nations in September of 2023 inferred that Poland was faking its solidarity with Ukraine and filed a complaint against Poland and several nations to the World Trade Organization in the same month.  
 
PiS leaders are keenly aware that undermining Polish support for Ukraine is unpopular and does not align with Poland’s strategic interest. Yet, by the end of their term, they began to distance themselves from Ukraine and highlight their roles in protecting the Polish national interests. Some scholars argue that the uncertainty of the electoral outcome has driven them to seek voters from the far-right Confederation and anti-Ukrainian farmers. During the last month of the PiS governance, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki made an unprecedented and contentious public declaration threatening to revoke Poland’s military aid to Ukraine to prioritize domestic defense capacity building, which did not come to fruition as Tusk’s coalition entered the government.  
 
Despite Tusk’s adamant pro-EU sentiment, the forceful demonstrations and border blockades by the Polish farmers and truckers led the government to maintain its restrictions on Ukrainian imports. As of May 2024, the talks between Poland and Ukraine are continuing to resolve this trade dispute.  
 
Tusk-EU Relations

Donald Tusk and his Civic Platform ran on a pro-EU platform, promising more ties between Poland and the EU. One of his biggest priorities after being elected was to warm relations with the EU by promising to reform the PiS-appointed Constitutional Court and withdraw their lawsuits against EU climate policies that were filed under the previous government. However, Tusk maintains Poland’s opposition to the EU migration pact.
 
Additionally, Tusk is maintaining a protectionist stance on Poland’s trade with Ukraine, continuing the path set by the PiS. Tusk’s identity lies with the European community, but domestically, he is keenly aware that his opposition accuses him of being a pawn of Brussels and Berlin. The EU and its collective actions are critical for Tusk’s agendas, however preserving Polish national interests and compromising with the domestic opposition appears to be equally important for Tusk.  
 
According to a recent poll by the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) in Poland, there has been roughly a 15% decline in approval for Poland’s membership in the EU since 2021. This may be a reaction to the EU-Poland conflicts and frozen funds under PiS governance. Despite the decline, EU membership is still overwhelmingly positive in Poland. If Tusk successfully reclaims the entirety of the lost funding, Polish approval for the EU will likely bounce back to pre-2021 levels. Currently, the European Commission has unfrozen 600 million Euros that was received by Poland in February, with billions more awaiting approval from the European Commission.  

As a firm display of solidarity with the European collective consciousness, in February of 2024, Poland joined 26 other EU member states in approving the $54 billion aid package for Ukraine. With Poland breaking their political partnership with Hungary since Tusk’s return, Hungary stood alone vetoing against the tide of collective action. However, the overwhelming pressure spearheaded by Poland was enough to force Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary to cave in, allowing the deal to go through. The increasing tendency for ostracized members, mainly Hungary, to acquiesce to the collective demand was greatly impacted by Poland’s renewed commitment to the EU. 
 
Future Trajectory 
To reverse the damaged relations with the EU under PiS is no easy task for Donald Tusk and his coalition government, but one thing seems certain: Poland is ready to take up the mantle as a bulwark against Russian aggression. With their strong support for Ukraine and dedication towards heavy investment in their national security, Poland will play an important part in ensuring the collective security of Europe. From Tusk’s objective of elevating Poland’s national status, it is evident that cooperation and coordination with its Western allies is critical to both the interests of Poland and Tusk’s identity. Furthermore, the Tusk coalition seeks to solidify its trajectory toward becoming the de-facto European leader facing Russian aggression. From inviting further NATO troop stationing and hinting at hosting the NATO nuclear arsenal on Polish soil, Poland is rapidly attempting to center itself in the NATO defense architecture. Once the arms deal with South Korea is concluded, it’s foreseeable that Poland’s ability to flex its muscles autonomously will be strengthened. Transitioning into a modern armed force with a state-of-the-art arsenal and industrial tacit knowledge through license manufacturing, Poland stands a firm chance of elevating its status on par with Germany and France in the region. With Poland bolstering its strength and showing a clear desire to lead and cooperate with its allies once again, the collective actions of the EU are expected to be much more promising.

Luke Park is a third-year undergraduate student at the University of Washington's Jackson School of International Studies. 

Caleb Chan is a first-year undergraduate student at the University of Washington Jackson School of International Studies.