 On July 22, 2024, Russia’s largest oil refinery in the Black Sea was ablaze. Debris from a Ukrainian drone attack had started a fire, which engulfed the refinery at Tuapse for several hours. Attacks like this have been a common tactic employed by both parties in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While Russia makes use of more conventional weaponry to target Ukrainian infrastructure, Ukraine has used cheaper UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) in saturation attacks targeting refineries and storage depots across Russia. Ukraine’s use of small quadcopter UAS carrying no more than a reported 5 kg of explosives enabled it to attack a vital section of Russia’s wartime infrastructure and pose a threat to its regime's legitimacy by targeting a crucial sector of Russia’s economy.
Much of the focus on UAS development and strategies has been on state-based conflicts, such as with Ukraine and Russia, and now Israel and Iran. However, the new technology has seen widespread battlefield use by non-state actors in the ongoing conflicts in Gaza, Yemen, and even the US border. The growing use of UAS by these groups poses a serious risk. The use of these weapons by non-state actors will allow them to destabilize embattled, under-resourced governments more profoundly than ever before. A Cost-effective Weapon First Person View (FPV) UAV systems are still in the early stages of development, but have already gained notoriety for their incredibly low unit cost, usually around $300 to $600, and high impact. Even purpose-built military UAVs come at a relatively low cost: the Iranian Shahed-136 is estimated to cost as little as $20,000 per unit. And for their cost, these weapons can destroy targets that are exponentially more valuable: FPV drones have been able to disable a $10 million Abrams tank. Obtaining these new UAV systems is not just inexpensive; it's relatively straightforward. As a civilian consumer item, the import and export of drones and their components are less likely to be regulated, and basic systems are relatively easy to manufacture in bulk. Both conventional forces and non-state armed groups have established drone workshops that refit consumer drones for combat use and schools that train civilians to be effective operators. Drone shops in Ukraine produce high numbers of cheap, purpose-made suicide FPVs, utilizing 3D printing technology to assemble components. The Ukraine Defense Support Organization has released a full buyer’s guide on which commercial models Ukraine needs, their costs, and how and where civilians could use them for the Ukrainian war effort. The guide estimates the typical cost of a FPV at $300-600. With the proliferation of cheap UAVs on the battlefield, non-state actors are presented with a potent new weapon system that they can afford. Limited resources impact the capabilities of affecting their capacity and willingness to obtain large, advanced systems. As such, non-state actors have traditionally been forced to rely upon older, cheaper, and less reliable weapons systems, often at the cost of precision and range—no longer. Countries that manufacture drone systems in bulk, notably Iran, have a proven track record of supplying and arming proxy groups. Given the comparative success of Iran’s Shahed systems, Iran’s proxies, such as the Houthis in Yemen and Hizbollah in Lebanon, might be able to procure these new systems from their backer. These groups have a precedent for using similar systems: in 2019, the Houthis were able to strike at vital Saudi oil infrastructure using delta-wing drones, a design similar to the modern Shahed. The Iranians likely supplied the UAVs, although Iran denies all allegations that it violated the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) weapons embargo on Yemen. If the weapons were of an indigenous Houthi design, as Iran claimed, then the potential that a regional militia group can develop and produce such weapons technology at scale would pose an even greater risk to regional security. The low costs of commercialized UAV technology can enable smaller regional actors and local players to punch above their weight, with plausible deniability and impunity, as they did in 2018 when drones were used in an attempted assassination attempt on Venezuelan president Nicholas Maduro. In that same year, a drone swarm attacked a Russian military base in Syria, albeit to limited effect. The attack was carried out by an unknown Syrian militia group. Below is an image of one of the homemade systems used in the Syrian attack. Targeting Legitimacy The ability to provide critical services is integral to a state's continued legitimacy. Infrastructure is vital to a state's ability to provide security and services. As such, insurgent groups and other non-state actors often pursue a strategy that prioritizes the targeting and disruption of critical infrastructures. Nationally strategic infrastructure is often protected against forms of conventional attack, yet lacks protection against threats posed by smaller, non-state actors. Undermining a state's ability to provide services and function in an orderly manner allows non-state actors to fill the vacuum they create. Attacks on infrastructure can range from attacks on fixed infrastructure (examples of which can include the targeting of vital roads or electrical infrastructure) to the targeting of vital apparatuses of the state, such as the Taliban’s campaign that targeted political gatherings and election infrastructure in Afghanistan’s 2019 elections. As mentioned, Ukraine’s targeting of Russian gas and oil facilities goes beyond the denial of strategic resources: it is a direct attack on a major source of state revenue. Resource-rich states rely on their resource wealth to maintain legitimacy and positive economic conditions. But the infrastructure that generates this wealth is often underprotected. Should non-state actors target refining and processing capabilities, they would be able to effectively disrupt a state's ability to govern. Reducing Geographical Limitations Small and inexpensive UAVs provide a means by which non-state actors can circumvent geographic isolation. As such, many groups have been quick to begin adapting to the new technology. Most non-state actors typically operate in the periphery, in regions far from the reach of a central government. This geographic separation has historically limited actors' ability to target vital infrastructure and government apparatuses. The effects of geographic separation can be observed in Sub-Saharan Africa, where several armed actors continue to fight among one another in the Sahel, a region that encompasses the peripheral Saharan interior of several developing and decentralized states. The Sahel’s armed non-state actors have been able to endure foreign intervention and consistent pressure thanks to the geographic isolation of the region: the Sahel is far from coastal central governments and lacks direct connections to large infrastructure. This isolation enables them to effectively deter any efforts from central governments to reassert themselves in their peripheral regions. However, these groups are also limited by the same geography that has sheltered them against repeated military interventions. They have a limited capability to strike at the faraway central governments. Utilization of long-range UAVs has drastically expanded their area of operation at an affordable price, allowing these armed groups to target vital infrastructure. In the civil war in Sudan, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces had been somewhat limited in their ability to target infrastructure that sustained the operational capacity of the Sudanese armed forces, until they made use of UAVs in an attack that disabled power generation facilities throughout government-controlled regions. Returning to the Sahel, the regional Islamic State faction, ISWAP, has allegedly been testing improvised drone delivery systems in the Lake Chad Basin, although these systems have not yet been used in a direct attack. Expensive to Defend Against Defending against small and medium-sized drone weaponry is prohibitively expensive. Intercepting military-grade Iranian drones has cost Ukraine up to $500,000 per drone. Anti-drone measures, such as nets, jamming equipment, and electromagnetic weapons, have so far been more expensive than the weapons they are meant to defend against. Spotting and tracking an attack, let alone being able to intercept it, is already a challenge. It becomes even more difficult when you take into account the capability of a small, civilian-grade UAV to evade conventional radar systems. The continued development and expansion of counter-drone defenses would also be limited to actors that can afford to procure or develop such systems. In the long run, developing such a comprehensive defense can carry prohibitive personnel and material costs for governments unwilling or unable to invest significant resources. There is also the concern that a government could exhaust its countermeasures before an opponent exhausts its UAVs. For instance, it would be very difficult for a nation like Niger, where only 1 in 7 citizens have access to electricity, to defend its existing infrastructure when its resources are already stretched thin. Additionally, while established military forces can re-evaluate their doctrines and existing strategies to account for the advent of drone technology, such an overhaul would be prohibitively expensive for under-resourced states, which are more likely face challenges from non-state groups. The prohibitive cost of defending against UAV technology contributes to its effectiveness as an offensive tool and underscores the importance of developing further countermeasures and of targeting non-state actors’ capacity to obtain UAVs in significant quantities. Conclusion All weapons inevitably find their niche in the evolution and adaptation of warfare. For the next few years, the proliferation of cheap and evasive UAVs will provide non-state actors with a significant offensive advantage. In time, low-cost defensive solutions will emerge, but groups will nonetheless seek to exploit their advantage while it persists. Nikita is a first-year student at the University of Washington, studying Political Science and Psychology
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |