 U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. Duke Pirak, left, acting director, Air National Guard (ANG), poses for a photo with Tin Yu Pak, president, Rainier Institute for Foreign Affairs, University of Washington (UW). Tin Pak: Thank you, General Pirak, for taking the time to share your insights on the current state and the future of the U.S. military, particularly the Air National Guard.
The 2022 National Defense Strategy identifies China as the U.S.'s primary pacing threat and emphasizes the need to deter further Russian aggression, signaling a shift from the counterterrorism focus of the past two decades to a posture resembling the great power competition of the Cold War. How is the Air Force adapting to align with the demands of this new era in U.S. foreign policy? General Pirak: I really appreciate that question. First off, thank you for having me. It's an honor to be back in Seattle. The 2022 defense strategy and really the strategy prior to the previous administration zeros in on that strategic imperative of resetting conventional deterrence in the Asia Pacific with China as our primary pacing challenge and militarily being a pacing threat. However, for at least the better part of the past three decades, the U.S. Air Force had been retooled to fight the War on Terror, which largely occurred in the Middle East, and so it's proved difficult to shift our focus towards great power competition with China. As the saying goes, it's difficult to change the direction of an aircraft carrier with an oar so it is also difficult to change all the processes and procedures that have been in support of the War on Terror that had engineered the Air Force to fly in largely uncontested airspace and to hold any point at risk throughout the Middle East. The issue is that any type of air engagement in the Asia Pacific today is going to be entirely contested, and it will require an entirely different type of capability portfolio. It takes time to re-engineer the way the headquarters is structured, from how we organize our "wings"—the units comprised of squadrons that execute specific operational missions—to how we utilize and develop the higher-end, more sophisticated capabilities of those wings. The main difficulty when shifting strategies is engaging in ruthless prioritization. You can't have a strategy without exploring or delving into inescapable trade-offs, so the ability to shift focus to China as the pacing challenge and Russia as an acute threat requires an offset somewhere else. The long-running assumption was that we would be able to adjust our posture away from the Middle East. However, one person's strategic distraction is another’s strategic urgency, and since the U.S. continues to be globally engaged, it's been very difficult to make those trade-offs. The knowledge that we must fundamentally be a different Air Force with a different capability portfolio but simultaneously deal with the urgency of the now is a very difficult thing to navigate. Tin Pak: Recent plans for restructuring the Air Force—though classified in detail—move away from the traditional, overlapping structure of Major Commands toward a clearer division between institutional and combatant commands. In this new framework, the Air National Guard will shift from its role as a component of Air Force Headquarters to becoming an independent command unit. How has this restructuring changed the role and operational framework of the Air National Guard? General Pirak: When you think back to the traditional sense of a National Guard, they are your hometown Air Force and Army, with the ability to support state and localities first, with the state Governor being the first commander in chief and then the President being the ultimate federal commander in chief. The National Guard, winding the clock back 30 to 50 years ago, was extra–it was the surge and supporting force. Back then, the U.S. military was big enough to be able to fight and win our nation's wars because there was relief coming from the National Guard. The way things have gone since then, starting mostly in a post-911 environment, was the operationalization of the Air National Guard. The Air Force has gotten smaller over time, largely from the peace dividend post-Cold War, leading to the Air National Guard being deployed to all theaters of operations, primarily in the Middle East, just like the active duty to make up for the armed forces' overall reduction in size. What was created was an Air National Guard with relative parity in its capability with the active-duty Air Force, but since we are largely a part-time force, the cost of maintaining our force is significantly cheaper, making it of great value to the U.S. What has changed with this restructuring is that the Air National Guard will be considered an Institutional Command with the Air Force's largest service-retained portfolio of capabilities with 108,000 airmen across 160 plus communities and 90 wings. We are no longer just the surge force if there's a problem. Instead, we will be right up front, fighting and winning our nation's wars with the active-duty Air Force, representing an enormous part of any war effort and comprising approximately 30% of the Air Force. Tin Pak: I'm curious. Why, specifically, is the Air National Guard being upgraded to an institutional command? The Air National Guard has its heritage in this dynamic as an augmentation force, this force that's held in reserve, and then you sort of spin it up, and then you send it in. For instance, a fighter unit in the Air National Guard would spin up, and then it would go where the Air Combat Command would tell it to go. What's changed now is we have these service component commands like the Pacific Air Forces and European Air Forces that are servicing the requirements of combatant commanders. Those ladies and gentlemen are responsible for a particular geographical region. So then the institutional commands like the Air National Guard (along with Air Combat Command and Air Force Reserves), are responsible at home for ensuring that those units are organized, trained and equipped to go out and perform the duties in the service component commands. But it's largely a pragmatic shift, and it also is largely because this dynamic has changed where, by any measure, the total force that is the active-duty Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve is much smaller than what it used to be 30 years ago. So now the Air National Guard is not postured to be only an augmentation force. The Air National Guard must posture to be on the front line, and so that's really part of the reasons for this restructuring. Tin Pak: Acting in this role as a reserve force with higher readiness, a challenge that must come up is prioritizing threats that you referred to earlier, which is the focus of my next question. Clausewitz stipulates that a force’s strategic reserve must be designed to address unforeseen yet “imaginable” contingencies. Given the vast range of potential threats and the inherent limitations of any force to prepare for every possibility, what decision-making process do you use to prioritize which unforeseen but imaginable threats should be addressed over others? General Pirak: I spend every minute of every day thinking about how to enhance the combat readiness of the Air National Guard–that's what I do because readiness is one of those things that you can't cram for like college finals. Readiness is a competency that's built up over time, and that's absolutely what we must do. Of course, we have a limited amount of time with our guardsmen to do that, and so I need to place a premium on all efforts, operations, and activities that enhance combat readiness. There's a chapter in the 911 Commission report that talks about the failure of the imagination, particularly the failure of our agencies to imagine and to conceive of the kind of things that happened on September 11th, 2001. I believe it's a Thomas Schelling quote that says beware not to “confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable.” I think looking at the 21st-century threat environment, it would be very dangerous for us not to spend every day thinking about combat readiness and to view a major war with one of our competitors as a distant, unimaginable thing. That would be a major mistake for us. In fact, I would say that every day that we spend focusing on readiness deters war as it indicates to our adversaries that we are serious about preparedness. Moreover, in terms of the size of our capabilities portfolio, we have less so-called “end-reserves” –the total number of reservists–these days, but what we do have is a unique connectivity to the American people. The unintended consequence of our all-volunteer force is that, sociologically, we have created a sort of military class. Generally, people who join the military already know somebody or have a family member in the military, which is why only around 1% of our population is in the military. The good news is that with the Air National Guard being in over 160 communities throughout the country, we have the ability, when we mobilize the guard, to mobilize America because those members are coming from those 160 different locations and are all consolidated into a large active-duty base. This ensures, through that broad mobilization process, that we're going to war with the will of the American people who come from all corners of the nation. Tin Pak: Speaking of broad mobilizations of the armed forces. The 1950 invasion of South Korea by North Korea caught the U.S. off guard, leading President Truman to activate large portions of the reserve, including 80% of the Air National Guard. With potential conflicts in East Asia today, what steps has the Air National Guard taken—and what ongoing measures are in place—to ensure wartime readiness for a sudden major conflict? General Pirak: The biggest part of maintaining readiness is ensuring that all of our wings have access to exercise funds that put them in unfamiliar situations. I always put it this way, as opposed to the wars we've been fighting in the Middle East, where air power is employed from a great distance from the battlefield with airmen at bases that are largely very well protected with aircrew flying over the battle space relatively uncontested and able to take hold of any point at risk within minutes. For future conflicts, we've got another scenario where our airmen will be based close to the fight, and as our aircrew get airborne, they will be engaged in a very deadly, contested battle space. I cannot have our airmen's first experience with that type of combat be the real one. I must give them an opportunity to experience this kind of combat in training, where they have to make decisions that are unfamiliar to them and that they previously thought were unlikely. I must put them in a scenario that is complex, where they have to take on risk, and where decision-making authority is distributed to the lowest possible level. Candidly, I must put those airmen in a scenario where they fail. They must experience failure in an exercise. It's similar to working out: you need to push yourself to the point of failure, as that's the only way to improve. That's the kind of thing that we need to be doing. I'll tell you, though, that the system isn't necessarily as supportive of these types of exercises because the military often sets up exercises where we know that we can win. Instead, we must be engaged in exercises that make us a little bit more hungry and a little bit more desperate. In turn, I believe this will make us more innovative in getting after those deadly threats. Tin Pak: Shifting gears to technological innovation, China’s military has been making significant investments in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and sixth-generation aircraft. In response, which technologies is the U.S. Air Force prioritizing in its research and development to maintain a competitive edge against these advancements by China? General Pirak: The real answer is probably a more classified kind of conversation. Still, I would say broadly, I think that the United States Air Force is focusing on the kinds of capabilities that allow us to engage in this highly contested environment. It extends far beyond just stealth technologies. Critically, it encompasses advanced artificial intelligence and long-range weapon systems, often referred to as the long-range kill chain. The latter concept involves integrating multiple long-range weapon systems into an advanced network, enabling them to operate effectively within contested environments. Notably, it eliminates the need for aircraft to physically enter these contested spaces, allowing for precision strikes from a distance instead. Additionally, we're dealing with distances that are almost unimaginable in an air power context, literally being challenged by the curvature of the earth, which then compels you to integrate space assets to track where bad guys are. This is an entirely new environment that requires an entirely new capability portfolio, which is very expensive. Those are the things that we're trying to get after. Without us investing in those things, we cannot re-establish deterrence. We want to raise the perception of cost to our enemies who try to take advantage of any weaknesses we may have. But I'll tell you, just with my engagements with industry, I bank on America. I bank on free market capitalism–Americans are innovators. There's always a race in the U.S. motivated by the profit motive and patriotism, and I think that's the champion spirit that we have. This will require significant public-private partnerships which is what gives us our competitive edge. I will always bank on American innovation over anybody else. Tin Pak: On the topic of innovation, given the unprecedented role of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in the Ukraine conflict—where both Russian and Ukrainian forces are deploying squadrons of small commercial drones for artillery reconnaissance and kamikaze attacks—has the Air National Guard begun incorporating these smaller, more agile UAV systems and strategies? General Pirak: The Air Force is looking at those developments and certainly the Air National Guard is as well, looking at both how one might employ small UAVs differently and then also defend against them–this is a real issue. Even domestically, we've had issues in terms of securing some of our installations from drones, with folks who are overflying our installations being an obvious security concern. We need to be able to defend against those things. So, it is definitely a game changer. But here's a position, I suppose, that could be challenged by some. I think it's really important as military professionals to give these, what we might call revolutions in military affairs, their due respect and pay attention to these trends, but we must not over-correct. The war in Ukraine is largely shaped by the fact that neither side has been able to gain and maintain air superiority. There's a relative stasis there from both having a relatively sophisticated, integrated air defense system capable of shooting down opposition airplanes so neither is able to effectively fly over the other's territory to take out the launch points of these UAVs. It's this dynamic that has created an air zone wherein UAVs can flourish. It will certainly be an important and deadly part of any future conflict, but I don't necessarily think it's all about that. There are some people in our business who want to overcorrect and say, “well, that's the death of fighter jets,” and that's just simply not true. You have to step away and ask yourself, why are these UAVs so effective right now? The answer to this question is that there are other concomitant factors that contribute to its effectiveness. One of the interesting aspects of this topic is that there's a cost imposition that occurs on both sides when a flying object, whether it be a small UAV or a larger weapon that represents basically the same radar cross-section, is being shot down by relatively expensive surface-to-air missile systems. And so I think that the greatest revolution going on here is the ability to use UAVs to empty the enemy's magazines. On the radar screen, it's difficult to differentiate threats between UAVs and cruise missiles. Nonetheless, they both have to be shot down. But if a cheap UAV is shot down because it is mistaken as a cruise missile with a very expensive surface-to-air missile system, that imposes great costs on the defender. I think that's a game-changer on the battlefield. Tin Pak: With that reference to missile defenses, the recent Israeli strikes on Iranian air defense facilities, following Iran’s launch of over 180 missiles toward Israel, highlight the critical role of aerial defense in modern warfare. In light of these attacks, what specific steps are the Air Force and the Air National Guard taking to strengthen the aerial defense capabilities of U.S. bases both abroad and at home? General Pirak: I will just note that some of those UAVs and cruise missiles used by Iran were shot down with fighter jets. In particular, an Air National Guard unit from Washington, DC, shot down many of these drones. They were able to do this because of an investment made years ago in electronically scanned array systems that were able to find some of these low radar cross-section drones, and they did very well. All of that is to say it was the family system or what is known as a system of systems approach, not just one component, that made them effective. A challenge that I've had in working with certain foreign partners that want to buy air defense systems to protect their most valuable assets is helping them understand that the best way to defend a fixed position is not necessarily at that position. Instead, it's at some position well forward where you get the early indications and warnings that whoever the bad guys are, they intend to use their weapons. You're detecting them from great ranges, from that most valuable asset that you're trying to protect. What that does is it gives senior leaders decision-making time to understand whether or not that is, in fact, a threat and whether or not to engage it. Conversely, if you're sitting with the radar on the ground at a fixed position, you have to deal with the curvature of the earth, so the threat can hide until it gets a certain number of miles away, and so you have less time. All of that to say is that the best way to defend against any of these weapons, when you're talking about air defense, is to be fully networked. Getting all this architecture, getting all these radars out at all these necessary positions, and creating a single integrated air picture is a significant technological leap that is the best way to defend America at home or abroad. Tin Pak: Thank you again for visiting us and having an interview. Your insights are nuanced and highly valuable in understanding the current state and future of the U.S. armed forces. General Pirak: It's my absolute pleasure. I hope this was helpful to you. Tin Pak is the President of the Rainier Institute for Foreign Affairs.
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