A conversation with Dr. Vlasta Zekulic on NATO's Strategy Development and Croatia's Military2/13/2025
Tin: From your lengthy career in high-ranking military positions in the Croatian military and NATO, what are the core leadership principles that made you successful in leading in these organizations?
Dr. Zekulic: I would say that the first one is focus. When you lead, there are no distractions, and there is little space to make mistakes. Second, there is nothing in the military that can be accomplished alone. So, the ability to synchronize and create synergies between units and people is absolutely key. You constantly depend on somebody else, so you need to be able to work with others. You have to be open to others' opinions. You have to be able to negotiate to find a solution. In the Croatian military and NATO, you have to find a way to work effectively with others to deliver the results on time. And last but not least is trust. I found that whether between commanders and subordinates or between the nations or NATO commands, without that personal trust, nothing happens. You have to be a trusted agent. You have to be somebody that when you speak, people know that they can trust and rely on you. Even if you’re bringing bad news. Tin Pak: What role do smaller nations like Croatia play in NATO's security framework, which is dominated by larger powers like the US, France, and Germany? Dr. Zekulic: We have to remember why NATO was established. A lot of times, people forget that in 1949, NATO was not established for the big, for the strong, but to help protect the weak. European countries just out of the Second World War were destroyed, and suddenly, another nemesis rose with the Soviet Union. To protect one another, the bigger ‘brothers and sisters’ led by the United States and the United Kingdom answered the call of these smaller countries to stand with them. This led to the formation of NATO as an organization to provide security guarantees for these smaller countries while protecting the geopolitical interests of the bigger ones. 76 years later, even though the alliance is combined now with far more small nations than big ones, that first postulate still stands: we need the bigger nations to provide the security umbrella. Small nations are willing to do everything they can to help. But if you look at Croatia, for instance, as a nation of 3.8 million people, there is only so much it can give. They can contribute a lot in relative amounts but not in absolute ones. Croatia has a full brigade under NATO command. They participate in all the rotational heads' forward presence in the Baltics. We participate in exercises, and we plug into every single international framework that we can. But again, if you look at the absolute numbers, the one brigade Croatia has committed is nothing in comparison to what the United States contributes in absolute numbers, yet it's almost half of Croatia’s land forces. Nonetheless, small nations like Croatia are doing everything they can to be a strong, reliable, and interoperable alliance partner. Within NATO, we follow a leading nation framework concept, where one of the bigger nations, usually Germany or Italy, will say, “okay, we are setting up this battle group or this project, who wants to contribute to it?” For Croatia, it's harder to lead like this, but we are always there to contribute to these larger initiatives. Therefore, what smaller nations need to do is to be stable, strong, capable, prepared, and interoperable with NATO standards across the board to assist these leading nations. This entails replacing legacy equipment with modern Western standards, such as tanks and airplanes, for instance. Tin Pak: With the greater numbers of hybrid attacks from Russia against NATO nations since the beginning of their invasion of Ukraine, how is and should NATO, as a collective security alliance, further deter hybrid attacks by Russia and its proxies? Dr. Zekulic: NATO started focusing on asymmetrical warfare, otherwise known as hybrid warfare, beginning in 2009, when we were running operations in Afghanistan. There were a variety of attacks on us, incorporating a broad range of unorthodox tactics whose source was ambiguous. The illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 was a watershed moment for the emerging concept of hybrid warfare. Without a shot fired, Russia was able to take hold of the territory through the employment of unorthodox and shadowy tactics, most notably in the deployment of non-insignia Russian troops called “little green men” alongside information campaigns. Following this event, NATO defined three necessary steps to address the future of hybrid warfare. The first step is to be better prepared. Second, we needed to figure out how to deter these attacks. And thirdly, how to defend against them. And over the years, the work on all three lines of effort really matured significantly. Where things got complicated was with the introduction of rapidly advancing technologies and digital tools, such as AI. The greatest vulnerability to hybrid attacks for NATO is in digital space. We are giving so much information about ourselves through digital channels that our adversaries are able to harness this and do exactly what they want: break us from within. In response to these growing threats, NATO has established the Resilience Committee to increase the strength of our critical infrastructures and civil societies. We trained a lot of people by increasing their awareness and understanding of where and how these hybrid attacks are happening. We also developed a comprehensive hybrid preventive and responsive toolbox, given the nation's capabilities, to help them identify hybrid attacks and what to do about them. Additionally, since 2019, NATO allies have agreed that hybrid attacks can trigger Article 5, NATO’s mutual defense clause. The last element that's making it far more challenging in recent years is China. China started using hybrid attacks before Russia, but they were doing it in a different part of the world. Since 2019, we've seen not just their rise of using hybrid activities against us in Europe, but now we have seen that Russia and China are working together to deliver this. This is quite a serious challenge because Russia has a good understanding of who we are, how we operate, how we think, what makes us afraid, etc. On the other hand, China has the tools that can cause a lot of damage, particularly cyber tools, and economic coercion. Thus, the interplay between the two is something that's quite worrying. But we are handling it. Tin Pak: From your experience as the branch head of NATO's Strategic Issues and Engagements department, what does the process look like in formulating and developing strategic solutions in NATO? Specifically, how do you ensure the policies that you guys develop align with all 32 members of NATO’s expectations? Dr. Zekulic: There are two sides to NATO decision-making. As a political-military alliance, politicians make the final decisions, but we, as the military, provide most of the information and advice during the formation of policy. Let's say we have a problem. A nation is saying there is an issue with a region or with an adverse actor. They then present their problem to NATO’s military authorities, who deliver unfettered military advice. Their job is to identify the core of the problem, understand what adversaries are trying to achieve with it, and finally offer Courses of Action to combat it. And then, the advice that we provide goes to the NATO Military Committee for the first layering of political and national considerations of our advice. NATO Military Committee is the first body inside the NATO headquarters in Brussels where all nations come together to discuss military challenges and solutions. At that point, the military authorities representing 32 allies look at our proposals. They then make edits and comments, saying, “We agree with this part. We should emphasize this here. I believe we should do more in this area and perhaps less in that one.” And then, that document goes to the political authorities – either from the foreign service or the ministry of defense, depending on the nature of the problem. They will analyze it and provide a political overview before submitting it for final approval by the North Atlantic Council – the most senior NATO decision-making body. In forming policies throughout this process, you need to know to make these documents as simple as possible but as complex as required. Simple, because the bureaucrats across the organizations will translate these policies in more than 20 languages, and it must resonate well across all of them. For example, in French, deter and dissuade are the same word, so strategic deterrence in English can mean something very different in French. But also complex, because it has to show and prove that it can solve the multidimensional problems that we are focused on. There are all of these things that you need to consider when you're writing a document so that it will not be misinterpreted. Finding this magical NATO language, which is as simple and clear but also strategically ambiguous enough that the nations can interpret it in different ways, is the art of our International Staff in Brussels. It's a science and an art. Negotiations over the wording of documents are not easy. Sometimes, they can last for weeks, as 32 nations need to say yes and commit to it. Tin Pak: Pivoting more towards Croatia specifically. I'm interested in your experience as a former commander of the Croatian Defence Academy. What were the most important values, principles, and concepts that you sought to instill in your cadets and future military officers to prepare them for modern warfare? Dr. Zekulic: Because everyone is different, you have to instill specific leadership styles that work for each one of the cadets. You still need to teach them the basic principles, but it's important that they understand how they will personally apply them to their subordinates and superiors. The first thing, from beginning to end of officer training, is integrity: doing what's right even when nobody's looking. Integrity is at the core because integrity leads to accountability. Moreover, if you're willing to do your best and admit your mistakes, it builds trust amongst your peers. The second part is professionalism. I always told my cadets that they have to be the best possible expert in their field. Nowadays, it's very hard to convince young people to learn the basic skills in their professions. They're always telling me that with the advent of all these new technologies that assist with our work, learning these skills is obsolete. However, in our world, we work in classified environments. There is no phone on you. There is no internet. When you're closed in the room, in the classified areas, what you have in your head is the only thing that's going to be able to deliver. If you're on a battlefield and the communications go down, there's no Googling. Either you know what to do, or you don't. Either you know the plan, or you don't. The ability to learn, retain, and connect information and be professional in these environments is very important. But at the end of the day, we just try our best to put our cadets in a situation where they have to learn. You never stop learning. I'm 46 now, and I have almost 30 years of experience. I continue to learn every single day because there is always something new. So having this mindset, it's something that's very relevant. And last but not least is physical strength. Physical strength leads to endurance, which strengthens our mental capacities. We work in a very stressful environment with long hours when you don't know when your next meal is and if you are going to sleep that day. You have to develop this relationship between the body and mind. That can never be neglected. I work with four-star generals that are in their late 50s. When they travel, they’re in the gym or going running every day. You cannot stop training your body. And again, it's not just a physical thing because it balances your mind and teaches you about how to deal with discomfort, pain, and pressure. Tin Pak: Looking back at Yugoslav Wars. How has Croatia's relationship, since then, with its neighboring Balkan nations, particularly Serbia, changed over this period? Are you concerned about another possible outbreak of hostilities among these nations? Dr. Zekulic: All Balkan nations, except for Bosnia and Hercegovina and Serbia, are members of the Alliance. We all get and understand each other, including Bosnia and Hercegovina who is a candidate nation. Serbia obviously does not have NATO ambitions, but they do have EU ambitions, so they're playing a little bit more by the book than was the case in the past. However, there is always, potential for disruption in the region, particularly through the actions of Russia. There is the problem of Republican Srpska, who are not working with the rest of the Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities in stabilizing the country. And obviously, there is an enduring issue with Kosovo. Amongst this regional instability, for us as a Croatian state, there are four main pillars to our national strategy that we have to execute. The first one is safeguarding the security of the Croatian people and the territorial integrity of the country. The second part is ensuring the well-being of our people. The third one is the solidifying of our national identity and building a strong international influence. This leads to the last aim of the Croatian security strategy, which is the protection of Croatian minorities in the other Balkan countries. Although one of the constitutional peoples, we are a minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and there is a risk that with the growth of the Bosniak population and the radicalization of the Serbian population, Croatians will be pushed out from government decision-making. Most of the time in NATO negotiations, Croatia doesn't have a strong opinion on many things until the Balkans are mentioned. Then, our diplomats pull out a huge list of instructions and demands of what we have to protect regarding our ethnic minorities and securing the future of the region. The primary solution to ensure our interests in the region is to mature enough to meet NATO standards and become a strong member of the alliance. Once we are all inside NATO, we are pretty confident that the risk of any escalation of tensions or conflict will decline greatly. Right now, it's still fragile. Every now and then, you can see tensions escalate in Kosovo. The solution for Kosovo is not easy because there are still several allies who have not recognized Kosovo as an independent state, which is really impeding our ability to find a long-term solution. And unfortunately, that solution is not something NATO can very much help with. It's mostly up to international diplomats and the European Union. As a military alliance, we only have to make sure that the conflict does not erupt there. Therefore, a NATO peacekeeping footprint in Kosovo remains. Tin Pak: Building from the previous question. What role does Croatia's military play in deterring conflict in the Yugoslav region and Eastern Europe more generally? Dr. Zekulic: There are two parts to that. The first part is, politically, we do not let the topic of the Western Balkans get off the agenda. With the war in Ukraine and in the Middle East, there are more urgent threats to the alliance, which sidelines many other issues we face. The second part is that, although we don’t currently feel threatened by our neighbors, we seek to maintain a strong deterrence in the region. This involves ensuring our ability to mobilize, modernize, train, and equip a modern military force. This serves as both a regional and Europe-wide deterrent, particularly in the southeast of Europe. For example, we are part of the NATO multinational headquarters center. This means that for all of the movement of units towards the Black Sea for any NATO operations, Croatia would be part of these operations. We contributed by helping open the convoy's airspace and land space. Also, as part of our own war legacy, although we have defense assurances from our NATO allies, we refuse to become completely reliant on others for our protection. Critics say that Croatia is too small to justify maintaining a combat air force. They say that air protection can be provided by Italy. But for Croatia, it's important that we have all of it. We have land forces that are equipped with modern weaponry, and we have a capable air force. We just now bought Rafale fighter jets from France and Black Hawk helicopters from the United States. We are small, but we are capable across the whole board. It's important for us that we are not just sitting behind and waiting for somebody else to provide security for us. We are doing our share. Tin Pak: Exellent. Thank you for sharing your insights.
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Navigating Trade Amidst United States Protectionist Policies: Suggestions for Small-Open States1/9/2025
Concerns over national security pervade the zeitgeist of policymakers in Washington, as protectionist policies become commonplace vis-à-vis big power competition. In response to China’s industrial overproduction, Washington has adopted their own industrial and protectionist policy playbook. The Biden administration recently placed tariffs on Chinese cranes, justifying the shift toward strengthening domestic industries with concerns over US national security. It argues that US reliance on cheap Chinese ship-to-shore cranes poses a significant national security threat to its maritime economy, which contributes nearly 2% to the US GDP. The US has cracked the pandora’s box of hawkish trade policies wide open. The world that once pledged to relinquish tariffs as a weapon will soon be a distant memory, and small-open economies around the world must reassess their strategies to prepare for a mercantilist Washington. Now, the priority of small-open economies, especially those reliant on trade, should be to promulgate liberal trade—which has served to provide foreign market access to supplement their small domestic markets—while also strengthening their domestic sectors. The challenge is to build-out said domestic sectors that may outcompete and disrupt US firms and supply chains without becoming a target of Washington’s economic stick. Play around the high fence Despite rarely being on the receiving end of US tariffs, Policymakers from small-open economies should be mindful of targeting industries and value chains that fall within the US’s small yard, high fence strategy. The US has identified domains for their protectionist regimes, placing strict restrictions on a small number of technologies while keeping other domains of trade accessible. Key technologies such as semiconductors, which are considered indispensable to the US’s competitive edge and national security, are protected by export restrictions to limit technology diffusion. Countries that can potentially leapfrog in these select industries to overtake American primacy risk facing economic pressure from the US. Small open economies should approach collaboration with the US on worker-centric policies, the US Trade Representative’s official position on bilateral trade policy, that prioritize the growth of its middle class, protect industrial jobs that are being injured by global trade, promote labor rights, and, most importantly, security of supply chains. Philippines, for example, has pledged to work with the US to implement internationally recognized labor laws as part of their trade framework to collaborate on strengthening agricultural supply chains. However, finding mutually beneficial domains will involve reckoning the realities of geopolitical risks. Washington’s ambiguous friendshoring policies limit where sensitive, supply-chain- critical inputs, such as rare earth minerals, can be located: it all depends on who the US believes to be their ‘friend’. Vietnam, for example, received the coveted comprehensive strategic partnership, the highest bilateral diplomatic status for essentially being the enemy of its enemy. Maintain WTO status quo For decades, the World Trade Organization (WTO) afforded immeasurable economic benefits to small-open economies. The WTO played a significant role in the success of large economies such as Japan and China—two of the US’ biggest economic rivals in history Washington is naturally a supporter of a WTO reform that limits the institution’s capacity to breed new economic rivals. Consequently, the Biden Administration continues to sustain the impasse that crippled the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. As the US continues to block appointments to the Appellate Body, the current WTO is unable to maintain an open, free, and non-discriminatory rules-based multilateral trading system that provides equitable judicial outcomes during trade disputes. Small open economies should become champions of the WTO status quo as the existing dispute settlement will give them a fair fight against unilateral tariffs in lieu of market power that empowers effective retaliatory tariffs. Alternatively, they can engage earnestly in multilateral alternatives to supplant their lack of economic leverage with institutions that enable equitable negotiation. The restoration of the WTO’s functionality must include reinstating the appellate court, resuming the Doha rounds of negotiation, and amending to include jurisdiction over national security-based trade sanctions. It is extremely unlikely the US will backtrack from their newly established agenda, but small-open economies must continue to urge for these changes as a trade and foreign policy priority. Champion regionalism Instead of relying on the WTO, Small-open economies can divert their commitmentto regional blocs and agreements that provide small-open economies with collective market power, greater leverage in negotiation, and a wider range of free trade agreements. The ASEAN, for example, has sustained strong year-on-year trade growth to allow better allocation of economic factors through trade creation for ASEAN Member States (AMS). Beyond quantifiable benefits, prominent regional trade blocs such as the EU, Mercosur, ASEAN, and AfCFTA have internal dispute protocols in place to promote intra-trade stability. However, there are no iterations of any regional dispute mechanisms that can supersede the WTO’s institutionalized mandate to enact penalties. For example, ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), although a legally binding instrument, lacks effective enforcement mechanisms as it is still just an agreement to dispute settlements exclusively by peaceful means. While there has been progress since the Bali Concord II in 2003 to improve “the existing ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism to ensure expeditious and legally binding resolution of any economic disputes”, there are no signs of effective policy deliberation to determine TAC’s institutionalization process. Small open states owe far more attention and effort to the supplantation of WTO. Establish high-level dialogue Developing clear lines of communication will help mitigate trade tensions escalating towards protectionist policies, as they enable countries to share concerns and address misunderstandings. US-led agreements such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) create high-level multilateral coordination on trade-related issues such as supply chain resiliency and outlines transnational industry practices. They also provide a platform to address tensions deriving from industrial policies, preventing unilateral response on trade disputes. Even though the IPEF only provides non-binding initiatives and no opportunities for market access, the opportunity for open dialogue may still be worthwhile. Small open economies must recognize the IPEF and similar US-led initiatives for what they are: a containment strategy against Chinese economic coercion. These economies must decide the degree of their commitment based on their existing hedge vis-à-vis US-China competition. Given the increasing prioritization of national security in trade policy, these strategies collectively enable small-open economies to safeguard their interests, balance geopolitical risks, and ensure sustained economic growth while navigating the emerging mercantilist landscape. Max is a graduate of the Jackson School of International Relations at the University of Washington.
Tin Pak: What do you believe are the key characteristics that make a great strategic leader, and how can these characteristics be applied in complex, multinational alliances like NATO?
Julazadeh: I think being a great strategic leader requires many characteristics, but let me narrow it down to my top four: vision, integrity, decisiveness, and collaboration. These are the qualities I think help leaders navigate complex situations and lead diverse teams such as NATO. Vision is the ability to see and understand long-term goals and the ability to articulate them in a manner that's clear and compelling for other people to follow. And then you've got to align those long-term goals to short term actions required to actually achieve those goals. In a place like NATO, vision is critical. The stakes are high and each nation has a different approach to the way they handle issues and different priorities. However having a vision allows and ensures the alliance remains aligned and can work toward shared goals and objectives. The second characteristic is integrity, a commitment to ethical principles that helps build trust, which is absolutely critical. Integrity fosters credibility and respect, which is essential for collaboration. In my mind, having integrity is not negotiable. Without integrity, nothing gets done effectively. Nobody trusts you, especially in an alliance like NATO. Everything is built on trust. So, if you lie, cheat, steal, or violate principles of integrity, people are not going to listen to you, and you're going to lose credibility very quickly. The third characteristic is decisiveness, the ability to make clear and timely decisions, even under pressure. You may not have all the information that you need at that moment to make a decision, but sometimes you must make one. In fast-moving situations, you have to make decisions using the best information you have at that moment. You have to be able to weigh the risks and the benefits and then balance that with the urgency of the task and your long-range goals. And then collaboration. In NATO, the ability to collaborate and work with teams and across organizations and to work across nations is absolutely critical. It ensures a unity of effort and, most importantly, capitalizes on the perspectives of 32 different nations. When you're looking at the kaleidoscope of nations in NATO, you have to be able to understand and navigate their interests. The only way you can do that is by collaboration, understanding what they think and feel, what their fears are, and what their concerns are. I developed my own acronym over the last eight years that incorporates these characteristics of leadership. I call it the T2C2 One Voice. The acronym stands for trust, transparency, communication, collaboration, and speaking with one voice. I shared this acronym – and its meaning – and over time, I heard others pick it up. This was my way of ensuring that everybody was on the same page and clearly understood my approach and intent. Especially with NATO, you have to constantly build trust through transparency. You have to communicate in a two-way conversation, thus allowing you to collaborate effectively. Once you've got everybody aligned, you've built trust, you've been transparent, you've communicated and collaborated, now you and they can all speak with one voice. And in an alliance like NATO, you must demonstrate that united front, both internally to the organization and externally to the world. Tin Pak: Looking at your bio, I see you have spent a significant portion of your career in Europe and in NATO-focused roles. What do you consider the most critical leadership challenges when working with multiple nations in NATO, and how can effective leadership bridge the gaps between differing national priorities and strategies to ensure a cohesive alliance? Julazadeh: As the old adage goes, “Where you stand depends on where you sit.” In the case of NATO, a nation's placement on the continent drives its national security concerns. If you're in the East, like Poland or the Baltic States, you're primarily focused on the Russian threat. That's your day-to-day focus. If you're in Spain, Italy, and perhaps Portugal, they're more concerned with terrorism and migration from the South. In the West, nations like France and the UK are looking at broader geopolitical concerns and challenges towards maintaining global influence. And in the U.S., as you're well aware, China has become the primary concern. This diversity of priorities is the most critical leadership challenge within NATO – aligning national priorities while at the same time maintaining unity of purpose. This goal underpins the concept that NATO is built on, which is collective defense. An effective leader in NATO requires balancing all these interests, ensuring everybody is working towards the same shared objectives. I’ll add it's extremely complex to be a strategic leader inside of NATO, to manage those competing interests while keeping a long-term vision of what the core mission of NATO is. Tin Pak: In combat, every decision can have an outsized impact on the trajectory of an operation or war. When confronted with a decision that has the potential to shape the outcome of a conflict, how do you balance tactical urgency with long-term strategic goals? Julazadeh: When confronted with a decision that could shape the outcome of a conflict or an operation, my first priority would be to remain focused on two things: the immediate tactical needs of the event, what must happen right now, and then the long-term strategic vision or strategic goals. As a leader, you've got to be able to set the tone and remain calm. If you start reacting rashly, you're going to cause problems. Remain calm and then remind the team what the objectives are, “Here are the short-term objectives, and here are the long-term goals we're trying to achieve.” Next, I would focus on gaining all the information I can. I have to understand the situation as best as possible through real-time intelligence and then coordinate across multiple organizations. NATO is huge. You have to coordinate across multiple nations and agencies. You got to manage the ambiguity as best as possible. You have to ensure that all the teammates, the agencies, the organizations, and the nations have a clear understanding of the situation and what actions you need to take to achieve the goals that have been set. Once you have that clear understanding, now you can take decisive action. I'll give you a quick short story here because I think it's useful. In F-16 training, we were told to wind the clock during an in-flight emergency. Since it is a single-occupant jet, anything that happens inside the jet, you are the only one that can be held accountable. During an in-flight emergency, you might get a series of red or yellow lights on the dashboard. The red lights usually mean something really bad, yellow lights are usually less time critical. The lights can indicate anything from the engine quitting to the hydraulics failing to a simple electrical problem. So, the first thing we're taught whenever we are faced with an in-flight emergency is to wind the clock. Which means, take the time to understand the problem before you react. Take a moment, assess the lights, the instrument panel, and the gauges to decipher the problem before you act. If you rush into action without fully deciphering the problem, you risk making a decision that could exacerbate the situation, delay recovery of the airplane, and, in the worst case scenario, could render the jet unrecoverable. If you execute switch actions in the wrong sequence, the engine may never restart, or the engine fire may not go out, forcing you to eject. I think the same principle applies to combat leadership. While there's a tactical urgency and the timing is important, you have to step back, wind the clock, center the team, collect the information, communicate a shared understanding, and then take decisive action. Tin Pak: The fog of war often leads to unforeseen threats and crises. What steps do you take when confronted with sudden developments, and how can strategic leadership effectively manage ambiguity in high-pressure situations? Julazadeh: In my mind, two-way communication, decisiveness and collaboration are the three key elements to effectively manage high-pressure situations. In high-pressure situations like combat, when time is limited, and decisions have major consequences, we need to be mindful of the impact those decisions have, not just on the short-term mission or event but on the overall strategic objectives. And this is where I think the winding the clock conversation becomes even more relevant. It's critical to pause, assess the situation, determine what the urgency is, and then make the appropriate decisions. Ideally, as a strategic leader, you will have previously war-gamed possible scenarios with your team and have a basic understanding what might occur as a result of your actions or counteractions. What you don't want to do is unnecessarily escalate a crisis, you need to manage it. And the only way you can effectively manage escalation is by understanding the consequences of your actions or inaction and ensuring you're thoughtful in your response. As I mentioned earlier, the added complexity of NATO really makes this decision-making process harder because it involves 32 nations. You have to clearly communicate, ensure shared understanding, and then collaborate with each nation before you make decisions. Tin Pak: With your extensive experience leading and flying combat missions, what do you consider the key principles for achieving and maintaining air superiority in modern conflicts, and how can NATO adapt to evolving air threats in the future? Julazadeh: Air superiority has traditionally been defined through several key principles; control of the air (denying the enemy access to the air domain ensuring we can operate freely; suppression of enemy air defenses or SEAD (neutralizing enemy radar and missile systems); defense of our airspace; air-to-air combat; and operational flexibility. While these principles endure, air superiority in the future will require increased integration across the air, maritime, and land domains but most critically, integration with the emerging domains of space and cyber…and in my opinion the “not yet named” information domain. The space domain is critical for maintaining air superiority; satellites enable communication, navigation, and intelligence. These capabilities are essential for real-time threat detection and decision-making. But space is no longer just a supporting domain, it is also a warfighting domain. As we move forward, gaining and maintaining space superiority will be directly linked to our ability to gain and maintain air superiority. Additionally, other advanced technologies, like AI, cyber, and quantum will really change the face of war. AI will enhance our ability to process vast amounts of information very quickly improving the quality and speed of decision-making. Quantum computing will enhance encryption and improve our communication security, making us more resilient. Hypersonic weapons move so darn fast that traditional systems can't intercept it, changing the entire operational environment. To wrap up, I think the core principles of air superiority remain essential, but success in future conflicts will depend on integrating emerging technologies and capabilities – space, cyber, AI, and quantum – to maintain our edge and ensure operational dominance. Tin Pak: How do you see the integration of AI, quantum computing, and other technological advancements shaping warfare in the coming years, and what strategic steps should NATO take to stay ahead of these emerging threats and capabilities? Julazadeh: AI, quantum computing, and space are revolutionizing modern warfare. These emerging technologies are essential for ensuring NATO stays competitive. AI accelerates decision-making by enabling real-time data analysis, improving situational awareness and enabling more informed choices on the battlefield. Quantum computing is a game changer, particularly in data processing and intelligence collection, allowing us to process information faster than anything else. NATO Center for Maritime Research and Experimentation, or CMRE, is advancing quantum sensing, which will enhance navigation precision especially in GPS-denied environments. Additionally, as I mentioned perviously, quantum advancements will improve communications and data security, making NATO’s cyber systems resilient to emerging threats. Cyber defense remains a priority. NATO just stood up the NATO Integrated Cyber Defense Center to help protect NATO networks and critical infrastructure. They're going to focus on identifying cyber threats and securing NATO’s networks to ensure operational continuity. To stay ahead, NATO must rapidly integrate these technologies into operations. While traditional domains like air, land, and sea are well understood, operationalizing cyber, space and potentially the information domain is crucial. NATO must adapt its strategy to incorporate the emerging domains and ensure its forces are equipped to address the complexities of future warfare. Tin Pak: As the former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Capability Development at NATO Allied Command Transformation, what do you believe are the most critical areas NATO must prioritize to remain agile and effective in the face of evolving security threats, particularly in areas like cyber, space, and multi-domain operations? Julazadeh: To stay competitive and effective in future conflicts, NATO must integrate space, cyber, and AI capabilities into a unified framework of multi-domain operations (MDO). MDO allows us to combine all domains into a unified operational framework. This is the future of warfare and it’s crucial that we break down traditional silos between these domains to provide rapid, coordinated responses to complex and evolving threats. The first priority is strengthening interoperability among NATO member nations. While each of the 32 nations bring strong capabilities to the table, not all of them work together seamlessly. Interoperability issues – like radios or satellite communication systems remain a hurdle. While we've made progress, there is still much to improve. Next, we must focus on interchangeability – the ability to seamlessly swap equipment and tactics between nations in order to response rapidly to emerging threats. Interchangeability is critical if we want to be able to respond quickly to evolving threats. The ability to interoperate and exchange systems between units from different nations will vastly improve operational effectiveness and increase resilience. Finally, adaptability is critical in today’s ever-changing threat environment. From cyber attacks to hybrid warfare, NATO must be able to pivot quickly. However, adaptability is only effective when supported by interoperability and interchangeability. So, NATO must prioritize the full integration of MDO to ensure we can operate cohesively and respond effectively across all domains. By combining interoperability, interchangeability, and adaptability we can ensure that NATO remains agile and ready to confront the threats of the future. Tin Pak: Shifting gears towards, more specifically, the U.S. and how they can prepare for the future. Given the evolving security landscape with threats from China, Russia and the Middle East, do you believe the U.S. military is mentally and physically prepared for another major war, and how should the U.S. enhance its readiness to face future conflicts, especially in light of technological advancements and global alliances? Julazadeh: The interconnectedness of today's global economies means no one truly wins a major war. Political and diplomatic efforts must always be the focus, but if we must defend our way of life, we must defend the four freedoms outlined by President Roosevelt: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. We must be ready, resilient, and capable of facing any adversary from any direction. Fortunately, I think the U.S. military is well-positioned to meet these challenges. We maintain a strong technological and strategic edge, and we're investing in critical areas like AI, quantum computer and sensing, hypersonic, and space. The U.S. Space Command and Space Force are transforming space into a warfighting domain, not just a supporting domain. We're strengthening our alliances, especially with NATO and Indo-Pacific partners, ensuring seamless operations domains and nations, which improves readiness and increases capabilities. We're improving our cyber defensive and offensive capabilities. And we continue to focus on training, readiness, and resilience. I believe we have the right foundation in place, and we're heading in the right direction. Preparedness is our duty and responsibility, embedded in the fabric of our military. I believe the U.S. military is in a very strong position to defend our values and remain a leader in maintaining global peace and security. Tin Pak: Excellent. I'd like to thank you again for participating in this interview and sharing your insights.
Tin Pak: Thank you, General Pirak, for taking the time to share your insights on the current state and the future of the U.S. military, particularly the Air National Guard.
The 2022 National Defense Strategy identifies China as the U.S.'s primary pacing threat and emphasizes the need to deter further Russian aggression, signaling a shift from the counterterrorism focus of the past two decades to a posture resembling the great power competition of the Cold War. How is the Air Force adapting to align with the demands of this new era in U.S. foreign policy? General Pirak: I really appreciate that question. First off, thank you for having me. It's an honor to be back in Seattle. The 2022 defense strategy and really the strategy prior to the previous administration zeros in on that strategic imperative of resetting conventional deterrence in the Asia Pacific with China as our primary pacing challenge and militarily being a pacing threat. However, for at least the better part of the past three decades, the U.S. Air Force had been retooled to fight the War on Terror, which largely occurred in the Middle East, and so it's proved difficult to shift our focus towards great power competition with China. As the saying goes, it's difficult to change the direction of an aircraft carrier with an oar so it is also difficult to change all the processes and procedures that have been in support of the War on Terror that had engineered the Air Force to fly in largely uncontested airspace and to hold any point at risk throughout the Middle East. The issue is that any type of air engagement in the Asia Pacific today is going to be entirely contested, and it will require an entirely different type of capability portfolio. It takes time to re-engineer the way the headquarters is structured, from how we organize our "wings"—the units comprised of squadrons that execute specific operational missions—to how we utilize and develop the higher-end, more sophisticated capabilities of those wings. The main difficulty when shifting strategies is engaging in ruthless prioritization. You can't have a strategy without exploring or delving into inescapable trade-offs, so the ability to shift focus to China as the pacing challenge and Russia as an acute threat requires an offset somewhere else. The long-running assumption was that we would be able to adjust our posture away from the Middle East. However, one person's strategic distraction is another’s strategic urgency, and since the U.S. continues to be globally engaged, it's been very difficult to make those trade-offs. The knowledge that we must fundamentally be a different Air Force with a different capability portfolio but simultaneously deal with the urgency of the now is a very difficult thing to navigate. Tin Pak: Recent plans for restructuring the Air Force—though classified in detail—move away from the traditional, overlapping structure of Major Commands toward a clearer division between institutional and combatant commands. In this new framework, the Air National Guard will shift from its role as a component of Air Force Headquarters to becoming an independent command unit. How has this restructuring changed the role and operational framework of the Air National Guard? General Pirak: When you think back to the traditional sense of a National Guard, they are your hometown Air Force and Army, with the ability to support state and localities first, with the state Governor being the first commander in chief and then the President being the ultimate federal commander in chief. The National Guard, winding the clock back 30 to 50 years ago, was extra–it was the surge and supporting force. Back then, the U.S. military was big enough to be able to fight and win our nation's wars because there was relief coming from the National Guard. The way things have gone since then, starting mostly in a post-911 environment, was the operationalization of the Air National Guard. The Air Force has gotten smaller over time, largely from the peace dividend post-Cold War, leading to the Air National Guard being deployed to all theaters of operations, primarily in the Middle East, just like the active duty to make up for the armed forces' overall reduction in size. What was created was an Air National Guard with relative parity in its capability with the active-duty Air Force, but since we are largely a part-time force, the cost of maintaining our force is significantly cheaper, making it of great value to the U.S. What has changed with this restructuring is that the Air National Guard will be considered an Institutional Command with the Air Force's largest service-retained portfolio of capabilities with 108,000 airmen across 160 plus communities and 90 wings. We are no longer just the surge force if there's a problem. Instead, we will be right up front, fighting and winning our nation's wars with the active-duty Air Force, representing an enormous part of any war effort and comprising approximately 30% of the Air Force. Tin Pak: I'm curious. Why, specifically, is the Air National Guard being upgraded to an institutional command? The Air National Guard has its heritage in this dynamic as an augmentation force, this force that's held in reserve, and then you sort of spin it up, and then you send it in. For instance, a fighter unit in the Air National Guard would spin up, and then it would go where the Air Combat Command would tell it to go. What's changed now is we have these service component commands like the Pacific Air Forces and European Air Forces that are servicing the requirements of combatant commanders. Those ladies and gentlemen are responsible for a particular geographical region. So then the institutional commands like the Air National Guard (along with Air Combat Command and Air Force Reserves), are responsible at home for ensuring that those units are organized, trained and equipped to go out and perform the duties in the service component commands. But it's largely a pragmatic shift, and it also is largely because this dynamic has changed where, by any measure, the total force that is the active-duty Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve is much smaller than what it used to be 30 years ago. So now the Air National Guard is not postured to be only an augmentation force. The Air National Guard must posture to be on the front line, and so that's really part of the reasons for this restructuring. Tin Pak: Acting in this role as a reserve force with higher readiness, a challenge that must come up is prioritizing threats that you referred to earlier, which is the focus of my next question. Clausewitz stipulates that a force’s strategic reserve must be designed to address unforeseen yet “imaginable” contingencies. Given the vast range of potential threats and the inherent limitations of any force to prepare for every possibility, what decision-making process do you use to prioritize which unforeseen but imaginable threats should be addressed over others? General Pirak: I spend every minute of every day thinking about how to enhance the combat readiness of the Air National Guard–that's what I do because readiness is one of those things that you can't cram for like college finals. Readiness is a competency that's built up over time, and that's absolutely what we must do. Of course, we have a limited amount of time with our guardsmen to do that, and so I need to place a premium on all efforts, operations, and activities that enhance combat readiness. There's a chapter in the 911 Commission report that talks about the failure of the imagination, particularly the failure of our agencies to imagine and to conceive of the kind of things that happened on September 11th, 2001. I believe it's a Thomas Schelling quote that says beware not to “confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable.” I think looking at the 21st-century threat environment, it would be very dangerous for us not to spend every day thinking about combat readiness and to view a major war with one of our competitors as a distant, unimaginable thing. That would be a major mistake for us. In fact, I would say that every day that we spend focusing on readiness deters war as it indicates to our adversaries that we are serious about preparedness. Moreover, in terms of the size of our capabilities portfolio, we have less so-called “end-reserves” –the total number of reservists–these days, but what we do have is a unique connectivity to the American people. The unintended consequence of our all-volunteer force is that, sociologically, we have created a sort of military class. Generally, people who join the military already know somebody or have a family member in the military, which is why only around 1% of our population is in the military. The good news is that with the Air National Guard being in over 160 communities throughout the country, we have the ability, when we mobilize the guard, to mobilize America because those members are coming from those 160 different locations and are all consolidated into a large active-duty base. This ensures, through that broad mobilization process, that we're going to war with the will of the American people who come from all corners of the nation. Tin Pak: Speaking of broad mobilizations of the armed forces. The 1950 invasion of South Korea by North Korea caught the U.S. off guard, leading President Truman to activate large portions of the reserve, including 80% of the Air National Guard. With potential conflicts in East Asia today, what steps has the Air National Guard taken—and what ongoing measures are in place—to ensure wartime readiness for a sudden major conflict? General Pirak: The biggest part of maintaining readiness is ensuring that all of our wings have access to exercise funds that put them in unfamiliar situations. I always put it this way, as opposed to the wars we've been fighting in the Middle East, where air power is employed from a great distance from the battlefield with airmen at bases that are largely very well protected with aircrew flying over the battle space relatively uncontested and able to take hold of any point at risk within minutes. For future conflicts, we've got another scenario where our airmen will be based close to the fight, and as our aircrew get airborne, they will be engaged in a very deadly, contested battle space. I cannot have our airmen's first experience with that type of combat be the real one. I must give them an opportunity to experience this kind of combat in training, where they have to make decisions that are unfamiliar to them and that they previously thought were unlikely. I must put them in a scenario that is complex, where they have to take on risk, and where decision-making authority is distributed to the lowest possible level. Candidly, I must put those airmen in a scenario where they fail. They must experience failure in an exercise. It's similar to working out: you need to push yourself to the point of failure, as that's the only way to improve. That's the kind of thing that we need to be doing. I'll tell you, though, that the system isn't necessarily as supportive of these types of exercises because the military often sets up exercises where we know that we can win. Instead, we must be engaged in exercises that make us a little bit more hungry and a little bit more desperate. In turn, I believe this will make us more innovative in getting after those deadly threats. Tin Pak: Shifting gears to technological innovation, China’s military has been making significant investments in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and sixth-generation aircraft. In response, which technologies is the U.S. Air Force prioritizing in its research and development to maintain a competitive edge against these advancements by China? General Pirak: The real answer is probably a more classified kind of conversation. Still, I would say broadly, I think that the United States Air Force is focusing on the kinds of capabilities that allow us to engage in this highly contested environment. It extends far beyond just stealth technologies. Critically, it encompasses advanced artificial intelligence and long-range weapon systems, often referred to as the long-range kill chain. The latter concept involves integrating multiple long-range weapon systems into an advanced network, enabling them to operate effectively within contested environments. Notably, it eliminates the need for aircraft to physically enter these contested spaces, allowing for precision strikes from a distance instead. Additionally, we're dealing with distances that are almost unimaginable in an air power context, literally being challenged by the curvature of the earth, which then compels you to integrate space assets to track where bad guys are. This is an entirely new environment that requires an entirely new capability portfolio, which is very expensive. Those are the things that we're trying to get after. Without us investing in those things, we cannot re-establish deterrence. We want to raise the perception of cost to our enemies who try to take advantage of any weaknesses we may have. But I'll tell you, just with my engagements with industry, I bank on America. I bank on free market capitalism–Americans are innovators. There's always a race in the U.S. motivated by the profit motive and patriotism, and I think that's the champion spirit that we have. This will require significant public-private partnerships which is what gives us our competitive edge. I will always bank on American innovation over anybody else. Tin Pak: On the topic of innovation, given the unprecedented role of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in the Ukraine conflict—where both Russian and Ukrainian forces are deploying squadrons of small commercial drones for artillery reconnaissance and kamikaze attacks—has the Air National Guard begun incorporating these smaller, more agile UAV systems and strategies? General Pirak: The Air Force is looking at those developments and certainly the Air National Guard is as well, looking at both how one might employ small UAVs differently and then also defend against them–this is a real issue. Even domestically, we've had issues in terms of securing some of our installations from drones, with folks who are overflying our installations being an obvious security concern. We need to be able to defend against those things. So, it is definitely a game changer. But here's a position, I suppose, that could be challenged by some. I think it's really important as military professionals to give these, what we might call revolutions in military affairs, their due respect and pay attention to these trends, but we must not over-correct. The war in Ukraine is largely shaped by the fact that neither side has been able to gain and maintain air superiority. There's a relative stasis there from both having a relatively sophisticated, integrated air defense system capable of shooting down opposition airplanes so neither is able to effectively fly over the other's territory to take out the launch points of these UAVs. It's this dynamic that has created an air zone wherein UAVs can flourish. It will certainly be an important and deadly part of any future conflict, but I don't necessarily think it's all about that. There are some people in our business who want to overcorrect and say, “well, that's the death of fighter jets,” and that's just simply not true. You have to step away and ask yourself, why are these UAVs so effective right now? The answer to this question is that there are other concomitant factors that contribute to its effectiveness. One of the interesting aspects of this topic is that there's a cost imposition that occurs on both sides when a flying object, whether it be a small UAV or a larger weapon that represents basically the same radar cross-section, is being shot down by relatively expensive surface-to-air missile systems. And so I think that the greatest revolution going on here is the ability to use UAVs to empty the enemy's magazines. On the radar screen, it's difficult to differentiate threats between UAVs and cruise missiles. Nonetheless, they both have to be shot down. But if a cheap UAV is shot down because it is mistaken as a cruise missile with a very expensive surface-to-air missile system, that imposes great costs on the defender. I think that's a game-changer on the battlefield. Tin Pak: With that reference to missile defenses, the recent Israeli strikes on Iranian air defense facilities, following Iran’s launch of over 180 missiles toward Israel, highlight the critical role of aerial defense in modern warfare. In light of these attacks, what specific steps are the Air Force and the Air National Guard taking to strengthen the aerial defense capabilities of U.S. bases both abroad and at home? General Pirak: I will just note that some of those UAVs and cruise missiles used by Iran were shot down with fighter jets. In particular, an Air National Guard unit from Washington, DC, shot down many of these drones. They were able to do this because of an investment made years ago in electronically scanned array systems that were able to find some of these low radar cross-section drones, and they did very well. All of that is to say it was the family system or what is known as a system of systems approach, not just one component, that made them effective. A challenge that I've had in working with certain foreign partners that want to buy air defense systems to protect their most valuable assets is helping them understand that the best way to defend a fixed position is not necessarily at that position. Instead, it's at some position well forward where you get the early indications and warnings that whoever the bad guys are, they intend to use their weapons. You're detecting them from great ranges, from that most valuable asset that you're trying to protect. What that does is it gives senior leaders decision-making time to understand whether or not that is, in fact, a threat and whether or not to engage it. Conversely, if you're sitting with the radar on the ground at a fixed position, you have to deal with the curvature of the earth, so the threat can hide until it gets a certain number of miles away, and so you have less time. All of that to say is that the best way to defend against any of these weapons, when you're talking about air defense, is to be fully networked. Getting all this architecture, getting all these radars out at all these necessary positions, and creating a single integrated air picture is a significant technological leap that is the best way to defend America at home or abroad. Tin Pak: Thank you again for visiting us and having an interview. Your insights are nuanced and highly valuable in understanding the current state and future of the U.S. armed forces. General Pirak: It's my absolute pleasure. I hope this was helpful to you. Tin Pak is the President of the Rainier Institute for Foreign Affairs.
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